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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
THE NEED FOR UNIFORM INTERIM
MEASURES OF RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n recent years, international commercial arbitration has
experienced a rapid expansion in use.1 Since the postWorld War II era, the arbitration field expanded considerably in
the context of international trade and commerce.2 The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 tremendously aided arbitration by leading to a substantial reduction in tariff barriers to
trade and a resulting increase in the level of international trade
of goods.4 Increasing international trade led to more disputes
between states, private companies, businesses, and persons.
International arbitration institutions flourished, and many jurisdictions passed new or updated international arbitration
statutes.5
International commercial arbitration has advantages and
disadvantages when compared to other forms of dispute resolution.6 Some advantages include neutrality of forum, speed,
lower cost, informality, enforcement, language, and confidentiality. Some disadvantages include lack of coercive powers, diffi-

1. For a discussion regarding the increased use of arbitration, see generally PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION? 9 (1999). See also Charlotte L.
Bynum, International Commercial Arbitration, ASIL Guide to Electronic Resources for International Law (Mar. 2001), at http://www.asil.org/resource/
arb1.htm.
2. See OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15 (1994). Also see James E. Meason & Alison G.
Smith, Non-Lawyers in International Arbitration: Gathering Splinters on the
Bench, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 24, 26–31 (1991), for a brief overview of international trade and its effect on international arbitration.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (entered into force in Jan. 1, 1948).
4. See CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 2, at 6.
5. See generally Clifford Larsen, International Commercial Arbitration,
ASIL INSIGHT (Apr. 1997), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight6.htm.
6. For a discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, see SANDERS, supra note 1, at 2–9. See also RICHARD GARNETT ET AL.,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2000).
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culty with multiparty disputes, and inability to appeal. Regardless of whether arbitration is more advantageous or disadvantageous to international commerce, it is unquestionable that the
use of international arbitration has grown and is still growing.7
Arbitration is an attractive alternative to litigation because
parties choose their own neutral dispute resolution forum.8
Parties tend to prefer settlement in a neutral forum, rather
than submitting to the jurisdiction of another party’s home nation.9 In addition, arbitration tends to resolve matters expeditiously because there is no court backlog and parties set their
own schedules. However, due to the increase of international
arbitration and the procedures of selecting forums and arbitrators, the length of time necessary to complete an arbitration has
also become increasingly long.10 While consideration must be
given to the fact that the arbitrators have to be paid (whereas
judges of a court do not), it is not unusual to hear the suggestion that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.11 Finally, parties tend to prefer arbitration because it is typically non-public,
allowing companies with long-standing relationships to resolve
their disputes away from public scrutiny.12 Most importantly,
arbitration is seen as providing the best chance to save the underlying business relationship.13
However, the system of international arbitration does have
its drawbacks. A major disadvantage of arbitration is the arbitral tribunal’s lack of coercive power necessary to support the
process.14 Such powers might be required to compel discovery,
the attendance of witnesses, or in the extreme, control over the
movement of the parties and their assets. An arbitrator has no

7. For a general discussion, see Michael Pryles, The Growth of International Arbitration, at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewas
attachmentPersonal/0417185A03AF31B7CA256C8A00025187/$file/Growth
INtArb.pdf (last visited June 7, 2003).
8. See GARNETT, supra note 6.
9. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes,
and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 95
(2000).
10. See Larsen, supra note 5.
11. See CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 2, at 8.
12. Id.
13. See generally, Drahozal, supra note 9. See also Meason, supra note 2.
14. See SANDERS, supra note 1. See also GARNETT, supra note 6, at 15.

File: WANG Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/21/2003 12:42 PM

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

1061

coercive power over third parties.15 Multiparty disputes are an
area where the tools of traditional litigation may be more helpful than arbitration.16 In many complicated commercial matters, there may be many interrelated contracts and parties,
each with the potential for bilateral but related disputes. In
this scenario, it may be desirable to hear all the related disputes concurrently; however, the arbitration process depends on
party autonomy and does not have the liberal joinder rules present in litigation.17 Thus, under certain circumstances, litigation may offer a more practical forum for resolution of claims.
International arbitration also has other significant discrepancies and dilemmas that need to be resolved. Another drawback
of the current state of international arbitration, which will be
addressed by this Note, is the lack of uniform granting and enforcement of interim measures in aid of arbitration.
This Note will argue that, in order for the system of international commercial arbitration to function effectively, a uniform
procedure for the awarding and enforcement of interim measures of relief is necessary. Interim measures are an absolute
necessity to protect what is at stake in the arbitration. Regardless of whether evidence, real property, personal property, or
financial assets needs to be preserved, there must be an effective procedure for maintaining the status quo. Without the protection of such provisional remedies, the outcome of the arbitration could become meaningless to the winning party.
In Parts I and II, this Note will discuss background information concerning international arbitration and provisional remedies, examining in particular the International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules,18 the United Nations
(“UN”) Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
Arbitration Rules,19 the UNCITRAL Model Law,20 the American
15.
16.
17.
18.

See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 15.
Id.
Id.
See ICC Arbitration Rules (1998), reprinted in COMPARISON OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (John J. Kerr, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002),
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp.
19. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules (1976), reprinted in COMPARISON OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts.
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Arbitration Association (“AAA”) International Arbitration
Rules21, and the London Court of International Arbitration
(“LCIA”) Arbitration Rules.22 This Note will also examine the
UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”),23 the primary enforcement tool of international arbitration. Part III presents
the legal framework of the system of international arbitration.
Part IV discusses the problem of interim measures within this
legal framework. Part V examines various approaches which
have been used in attempting to solve this problem, and the
final section presents recommendations for resolution of the
dilemma.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Framework for International Arbitration
1. The Arbitration Agreement
International arbitration differs from international litigation
in that arbitrating parties determine to a large extent what
procedural rules will govern the resolution of their dispute and
who will decide their dispute.24 The legal basis for arbitration
lies in an agreement by parties to submit disputes to an arbitral
tribunal.25 The arbitration agreement defines the issues to be
addressed by arbitration and the jurisdiction of the tribunal.26
The arbitration agreement also evidences the consent of the
20. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/40/17,
(1985), Annex I, available at http://ww.uncitral.org/english/texts (last visited
May 21, 2003).
21. See American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) International Arbitration Rules, reprinted in COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 18, available at http://www.adr.org.
22. See London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Arbitration
Rules (1998), reprinted in COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 18, available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/download/rules.
pdf.
23. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)
[hereinafter New York Convention].
24. See Larsen, supra note 5.
25. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 19.
26. Id.
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parties to arbitrate. Thus, where a dispute arises between parties who have entered into a contract containing an arbitration
agreement, the parties, subject to few exceptions, are obligated
to resolve their disputes according to the agreement.27 The parties must decide whether they wish to refer to and adopt the
processes of a particular institution, or tailor their own process
on an ad hoc basis.28 Depending on which form is chosen, parties may use recommended clauses of arbitral institutions.29
2. Institutional arbitration
If the parties choose institutional arbitration, they agree to
submit their dispute to an institution, who will administer the
arbitration. Under this system, care must be taken to ensure
clear and accurate reference to the relevant institution.30 Some
of the most common institutions include the AAA, ICC, or
LCIA. An agreement for institutional arbitration can resolve
most of the procedural and jurisdictional questions simply
through reference to the institution and its procedural rules.31
3. Ad hoc arbitration
In an ad hoc arbitration, the parties have the freedom to specifically choose the rules by which their arbitration will be governed. If the parties choose ad hoc arbitration, greater care
needs to be given to identifying various procedural issues. A
simpler alternative to trying to design a complete ad hoc procedural system is to designate one of the established procedural
rule systems.32 One of the more common ad hoc arbitrations is
one where the parties agree to arbitration by the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, with various modifications.33

27. Id.
28. For a brief discussion of ad hoc versus institutional arbitration, see
MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE
4 (2001).
29. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 33. See also Dispute Resolution Services
Worldwide, About Us, Resolving Commercial Financial Disputes — A Practical Guide (2003), at http://www.adr.org (including sample arbitration clauses).
30. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 34.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Larsen, supra note 5.
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B. Lex Arbitri
The lex arbitri, also know as the lex loci arbitri,34 is the law
governing the arbitration.35 All matters relating to the conduct
and procedure of the arbitration are subject to this law.36 For
example, questions of how arbitrators are appointed, how they
can be challenged, their powers for admission of evidence, and
what remedies they can award, are all subject to the ultimate
control of the law of the arbitration.37
Under the choice of law rules of almost all national legal systems, the basic rule applied is the “seat theory,”38 that is, the
law of the arbitration will be the law of the place where the arbitration is situated. It is also possible that the lex arbitri may
be a different national law than that governing the substance of
the parties’ dispute or governing the arbitration agreement.39 In
international commercial arbitration practice, it is rare for parties specifically to choose the lex arbitri, and the choice of the
place of arbitration is now recognized as shorthand for the
method of selection of that law.40

34. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 511.
35. GARNETT, supra note 6, at 20.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The “seat theory” is the idea that the lex arbitri, or the law governing
the arbitration, is based on the law of the nation where the “seat” of the arbitration is, or the state where the arbitration takes place. See Tatsuya Nakamura, The Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration — Its Fictitious
Nature and Lex Arbitri, 15 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 23 (2000).
39. See, e.g., id. at 26. French scholars maintain that French law does not
take the traditional approach of the “seat theory,” but takes a liberal approach
of recognizing the freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to the
arbitral procedure.
40. The trend in recent years has been to substitute the words “place of
arbitration” for “seat of arbitration.” See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ¶ 1239, n.94 (1999). See also YVES
DERAINS & ERIC SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION
(1998).
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C. Sources of Law
1. The UNCITRAL
Although the UNCITRAL is not an arbitral institution,41 the
UNCITRAL Rules can be adopted by the parties to an ad hoc or
institutional arbitration.42 The AAA, the most active arbitral
institution in the United States (“U.S.”), allows arbitrations to
be conducted using the UNCITRAL Rules.43
The UN General Assembly approved the UNCITRAL Rules
on December 15, 1976.44 The UNCITRAL is not an arbitral institution because it does not administer arbitration.45 Instead,
other arbitral institutions have typically agreed to allow parties
to adopt the UNCITRAL rules for their arbitration instead of
the institution’s own rules.46 In fact, some institutions have
adopted the UNCITRAL rules as their own arbitration rules.47
The UNCITRAL arbitration rules are unique in providing for an
Appointing Authority (“A.A.”).48 If the parties cannot reach
agreement on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the A.A.
has the final decision-making power. If the parties fail to agree
on the A.A.’s identity, then the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague,49 designates the
A.A.50 Article 26 specifically deals with the granting of interim
measures of relief.
The UNICTRAL Model Law (“M.L.”) was another achievement of the UNCITRAL in the field of arbitration. On June 21,

41. See PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION (2001).
42. See Larsen, supra note 5.
43. See SANDERS, supra note 37, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For example, the AAA commonly allows arbitrations to be administered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
47. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 1.
48. The Appointing Authority is a neutral party who may decide issues
dealing with the arbitration if the parties are unable to reach agreement on
these matters. See SANDERS, supra note 41.
49. See http://www.pca-cpa.org for more information on the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
50. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 1.
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1985, the Commission adopted the text of the M.L.51 The General Assembly approved the M.L. on December 11, 1985,52 and
requested the transmittal of the text to member states and arbitral institutions together with the travaux preparatoires.53 Today, forty-seven individual jurisdictions from all parts of the
world have adopted the M.L.54 Some countries have adopted the
M.L. as both their domestic arbitration law and their international arbitration law, while others prefer two separate regimes
of law.55 Even countries that have not adopted the M.L. have
clearly taken the M.L. into account, as evidenced by the English
Arbitration Act of 1996.56 M.L. Articles 9 and 17 govern interim
measures of relief.
2. The International Chamber of Commerce
The oldest and perhaps best-known arbitral institution is the
ICC. Located in Paris, the ICC also has its own separate set of
rules for arbitration.57 The ICC does not actually “decide” arbitrations but rather administers the arbitration, helping to select arbitrators, receiving and distributing pleadings, and reviewing awards for technical accuracy.58
The ICC founded the International Court of Arbitration (“ICC
Court”) in 1923, in order to place at the disposal of business an
international organization capable of settling international
51. See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS (2000).
52. G.A. Res. 72, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess. (1985), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r072.htm.
53. The travaux preparatoires are analytical commentaries by the
UNCITRAL’s Secretary-General and the Report of the Commission. See
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm for a comprehensive list of the various
travaux preparatoires available by the UNCITRAL.
54. See BINDER, supra note 51, at 8. For a comprehensive list of all fortyseven jurisdictions who have adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. in whole or part,
see id. at 9-10.
55. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 23. For a brief description regarding
the different types of adoption of the M.L., see BINDER, supra note 51, at 11.
56. For a general discussion of how the English Arbitration Act of 1996
takes into account the UNCITRAL M.L., see William W. Park, The New English Arbitration Act, 13 No. 6 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. (1998).
57. See DERAINS, supra note 37.
58. For a description of the role the ICC plays in arbitration, see W.
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
(3d ed. 2000).
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commercial disputes without recourse to formal legal procedure.59 The ICC Court has administered nearly 10,000 international arbitration cases and has become widely known as the
leading institution for arbitration of international commercial
disputes.60 The ICC Court, unique in its composition and role,
monitors all ICC arbitral proceedings.61 Its many functions include: whether or not to accept an arbitration; whether to permit joinder of arbitration; designating arbitrators; confirming
the appointment of arbitrators; and most notably, reviewing of
arbitrators’ awards.62
The ICC Arbitration Rules (“ICC Rules”) are commonly said
to have as one of their fundamental characteristics a “universal” character, meaning they are intended for use in any country, under any law, and in accordance with any system of legal
procedure.63 The ICC Rules are generally accepted as flexible
and autonomous, however, there is also a high degree of institutional involvement in the supervision of the arbitral process.64
The ICC also has other formal dispute resolution mechanisms. Through its National Committees,65 the ICC endeavors
to uphold the ultimate quality and efficacy of the arbitral process.66 The National Committees appoint members to the ICC
Court, assist in selection of arbitrators, and can be of assistance
in obtaining voluntary compliance with an award by a recalcitrant party.67
In 1995, the ICC Commission of International Arbitration
(“Commission”)68 appointed a Working Party69 to make proposals
59. See DERAINS, supra note 40.
60. Id. at 1.
61. See http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp,
for a general description of the court and its role.
62. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 3.
63. Id. at 3.
64. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 28.
65. The National Committees and groups ensure that the ICC takes account of their national business concerns in its policy recommendations to
governments and international organizations. For an overview of ICC procedure, see generally ICC, How the ICC Works, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/
intro_icc/how_works.asp (last visited June 7, 2003)
66. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 3.
67. Id. at 4.
68. The ICC Commission was formed to examine the Arbitration Rules and
make determinations about what changes were necessary.
69. The Working Party suggested general changes to the ICC Rules.
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to the Commission concerning the possible need for rule
changes. A major issue addressed by the group was the need
for clarification over the availability of interim measures.70 The
Working Party reported to the Commission that it proposed to
undertake a general examination of the ICC Rules with a view
to suggesting revisions that would assist practitioners, since
many changes to a well-known body of rules, such as the ICC
Rules, should not be made too frequently.71 The Working
Party’s changes did not fundamentally alter the ICC system of
Arbitration.72 However, the rules governing interim measures
of relief were changed. The former Rules did not explicitly state
whether ICC arbitrators could grant interim measures of relief.73 This was a great source of uncertainty. The revised ICC
Rules, through Article 23, makes clear that arbitrators possess
the power to grant interim remedies.
3. The AAA
The AAA is another institution available to resolve a wide
range of disputes through arbitration.74 Founded in 1926, the
AAA is an independent, non-profit organization headquartered
in New York with regional offices throughout the U.S.75 The
AAA holds lists of arbitrators, and international arbitrations
are regulated by the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.76 The
AAA amended their version of arbitration rules, rendered effective September 1, 2000.77 The rules are intended to provide ef-

70. See DERAINS, supra note 53, at 7.
71. Id. Changes to a well known body of rules should not be made too often
because it harms the stability of the institution’s rules and makes it seem
more arbitrary, like they can be changed at will.
72. For a description of the various changes made by the 1998 Rules, see
Filip De Ly, The 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules, 1 INT. A.L.R. 1998, at 220–31.
See also W. LAURENCE CRAIG, ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC ARBITRATION
RULES (1998).
73. See GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION, ICC Publication No. 448(E) (1994), for
a set of the ICC Arbitration Rules prior to the 1998 amendments.
74. See AAA, About Us, A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Association (2003), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15765.
75. See PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Alex Bosch ed., 1994).
76. Id. at 10
77. AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra note 21.
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fective arbitration services to world business, through the use of
administered arbitration.78
4. The LCIA
The LCIA is a very popular European international arbitral
forum.79 The institution is comprised of the Chamber of Commerce, the Corporation of the City of London, and the Institute
of Arbitrators.80 The procedure for interim measures is regulated by the LCIA International Arbitration Rules, as revised
on January 1, 1985.81 As with ICC and AAA arbitration, the
LCA Court is responsible for the organization and administration of the procedure and in particular for the appointment of
the arbitrators.82
D. Enforcement
1. The New York Convention
The New York Convention83 is the most important enforcement treaty in international arbitration.84 The treaty binds nations to recognize and enforce arbitral awards from foreign jurisdictions.85 The New York Convention was a substantial improvement upon the Geneva Convention of 1927, since it provided a simple and effective method of obtaining recognition
and enforcement of foreign awards.86 The New York Convention
has been described as “the single most important pillar on
which the edifice of international arbitration rests”87 and as a
convention which, perhaps could lay claim to be the most effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of
78. See supra Part I.
79. See LCIA, Arbitration; Rule, Clauses & Costs, at http://www.lciaarbitration.com/arb/ (last visited June, 7 2003), for an overview of the LCIA
and arbitration.
80. Id.
81. LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 22.
82. Id.
83. New York Convention, supra note 23.
84. See Larsen, supra note 5.
85. See New York Convention, supra note 23, at pmbl.
86. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 455 (1999).
87. J. Gillis Wetter, The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 91 (1990).
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commercial law.88 The New York Convention established a new
legal regime favoring international arbitration through the facilitation of recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements
and awards.89
As of January 1, 2001, 127 states were parties to the New
York Convention.90 The goal of the New York Convention is to
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of both agreements to
arbitrate91 and arbitral awards.92 Although the convention generally provides that arbitral awards made in any foreign state
are to be recognized and enforced,93 it specifically allows ratification with reservations limiting recognition and enforcement
to awards made in the territory of another contracting state
(the “reciprocity” reservation), and awards considered “commercial” under the national law of the Contracting State.94 The U.S.
included both reservations in its ratification.95 Along with the
Federal Arbitration Act,96 the New York Convention is a critical
source of law for international arbitration in the U.S.
As long as there is a written agreement to arbitrate, courts of
contracting states are required to enforce that agreement by
referring the parties to arbitration, “unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”97 Recognition and enforcement of an arbitration
agreement or award may only be refused upon limited grounds.
The New York Convention identifies five grounds on which recognition and enforcement of a Convention award may be refused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked.98 If

88. Lord Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43
(1989).
89. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 679–81.
90. See United States Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/part1/chapterXII/treaty1.asp (last visited June 7, 2003), for a comprehensive list of the 24 signatory states and the
127 states which are parties to the treaty.
91. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. II
92. Id. art. III
93. Id. art. I(1).
94. Id. art. I(3).
95. See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213 (1997).
96. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
97. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. II(3).
98. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 459.
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the opposing party can prove: (1) the incapacity of the parties or
invalidity of the arbitration agreement; (2) improper notice or
other lack of due process; (3) an award beyond the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate; (4) improper arbitral procedure or composition of the arbitral board; or (5) that the award has been set
aside or suspended or is otherwise not binding, then recognition
or enforcement may be refused.99 In addition, Article V(2) of the
Convention provides that recognition or enforcement may be
refused if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the enforcing state’s laws or if recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of
that state.100
2. The Role of National Courts
In an address to an international arbitration conference, Lord
Mustill compared the relationship between the courts and arbitrators to a relay race:
Ideally, the handling of arbitrable disputes should resemble a
relay race. In the initial stages, before arbitrators are seized
of the dispute, the baton is in the grasp of the court: for at that
stage there is no other organization which could take steps to
prevent the arbitration agreement from being ineffectual.
When the arbitrators take charge they take over the baton and
retain it until they have made an award. At this point, having
no longer a function to fulfill, the arbitrators hand back the
baton so that the court can in case of need lend its coercive
powers to the enforcement of the award.101

In principle, the relationship between the public world of the
courts and the private world of arbitration should not give rise
to any significant conflict.102 At the beginning of the arbitral
process, both under domestic legislation and under international treaties, such as the New York Convention, it is the
courts — and not the arbitrators — who must enforce the agree-

99. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. V(1).
100. Id. art. V(2).
101. Lord Mustill, Comments and Conclusions, in CONSERVATORY &
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 9th Joint Colloquium
(ICC Publication 1993) [hereinafter CONSERVATORY MEASURES].
102. Id.
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agreement to arbitrate.103 Again, at the end of the process, it is
the courts that must enforce the arbitral award.104 Thus, although parties tend to agree to arbitration in an effort to avoid
courts, the court system plays an essential role in the framework of arbitration.
III. INTERIM MEASURES UNDER THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK —
PROBLEMS
A. Various Types of Interim Measures
In arbitral proceedings, the need often arises for provisional
remedies or other interim measures of relief. These measures
are often needed because, in reality, arbitral proceedings are no
less adversarial than litigation in public courts. The idea that
provisional remedies are unnecessary or inadequate in arbitral
proceedings is to confuse arbitration with conciliation.105 These
interim measures take on different forms and are often called
different names. In the UNCITRAL M.L. and UNCITRAL
Rules, they are called “interim measures of protection.”106 In the
English version of the ICC Rules, they are known as “interim or
conservatory measures,”107 in the French version as “mesures
provisoires ou conservatoires,”108 and in the Swiss law governing
international arbitration they are referred to as “provisional or
protective measures.”109

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Conciliation is an informal process designed to create an environment
where negotiations take place. Arbitration, on the other hand, is a form of
private adjudication where a mutually acceptable third party hears arguments from either side in a dispute and renders a judgment. The judgment,
known as an award, is confidential and binding. For a discussion regarding
conciliation and its differences with arbitration, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 96–97 (1983).
106. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 345–46.
107. ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 18, art. 23.
108. French Code of Civil Procedure Code (Noveau code de procedure civile),
Book IV, Arbitration, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paullson ed., 2002).
109. Swiss Private International Law Act, 1987, c. 12, art. 183, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex II (Jan Paullson ed., 2002).
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Provisional remedies and interim relief come in many forms,
depending on the parties involved and context of the dispute.
However, most often these remedies entail either the seizure of
property, often called attachments or holding orders, or interim
orders, also known as injunctions.110 In attachment proceedings,
the intention of the petitioner is to preserve the assets representing the subject matter or being necessary for enforcement of
the arbitration award.111 These orders are designed to prevent
dissipation of the property or to preserve the condition of the
property for future inspection.112 Alternatively, a litigant may
be ordered to deposit property into the custody of a third
party.113
Another type of interim measure is an order to preserve the
status quo between the parties pending the resolution of the
merits of their dispute. For example, a party may be ordered
not to take certain steps, such as terminating an agreement,
disclosing trade secrets, or using disputed intellectual property
or other rights, pending a decision on the merits.114 In the interest of preserving the status quo, ICC tribunals have been
willing to order a contract to be performed for a limited period,
even though one party claims that the contract was rescinded.115
The provisional relief of preserving the status quo can be provided either by the arbitrator or by the public courts, during the
course of, and in conjunction with, the arbitral proceedings.116
Issues often arise as to whether arbitral tribunals or national
courts have the power to order such relief.117 The arbitral tribu-

110. For a discussion regarding the differences between holding measures
and interlocutory injunctions in international arbitration, see RUBINOSAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 631–33.
111. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4-5.
112. See
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 920 (2001).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 921.
115. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 463. In ICC Arbitration Case
6503/1990, 1995 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1022, the arbitral tribunal
ordered that a long term contract should remain in existence, and the parties
should exercise its terms during a period of one year after the claimed date of
rescission, to permit the arbitral tribunal to rule on the merits of the claimed
rescission and to avoid unnecessary damage.
116. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4.
117. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 354.
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nal must look to the set of arbitration rules under which it is
operating to determine if such jurisdiction is granted.118 The
courts, on the other hand, may have the power to act, but must
determine whether it would be appropriate to do so.119
Parties may also seek orders requiring adverse parties to post
security for satisfying the final judgment in the case.120 Orders
for security may be for either the amount in dispute in the underlying controversy or for the fees of legal representation and
other costs to be incurred in resolving the dispute.121 In ICC
arbitration, security for costs is usually not granted, nevertheless, the power exists and in some circumstances may be justified.122 Other interim measures of relief may include: orders for
payment of part of the claim, orders to comply with the arbitration rules, orders to a party to act or omit, or orders and recommendations of holding measures.123
Interim measures are incredibly controversial in international arbitration because of the inherent risks involved in
granting such orders. First, there is a risk that the issuance of
an interim order will represent factual victory in the main proceeding for the petitioner.124 Even though the decision is only
interlocutory, its consequences can often be irreparable. Additionally, there is a risk that the petitioner is being abusive in its
use of the request for an interim order. Parties often do not use
proceedings for provisional remedies solely to secure later enforcement of an award, but in reality use a petition for an in-

118. Id.
119. Id. The famous English case of Channel Tunnel Group Limited v. Balfour Beatty Construction Limited, [1993] A.C. 334 (Lord Mustill), XIX ICCA
Y.B. COMM. ARB. 736 (1994), is an example of a case where a national court
dealt with the issue of whether to grant an injunction to preserve the status
quo. The case went on appeal to the court of first instance to the Court of
Appeal, and then to the highest English court, the House of Lords. Each court
gave a different answer to the question posed. For a discussion of the Channel Tunnel case, see Claude Reymond, The Channel Tunnel Case and the Law
of International Arbitration, 109 LAW Q. REV. 337, 341 (1993).
120. See BORN, supra note 112, at 921.
121. See, e.g., Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 689
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
122. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 469. For a discussion of how the
ICC address security for costs issues, see id. at 467–69.
123. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 631–32.
124. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4.
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terim order as an offensive weapon.125 The interim order can be
used to exert pressure on the opponent by threatening the seizure of its assets abroad.126 Moreover, interim proceedings may
also be used as dilatory tactics to stay the general progress of
the arbitration.127 Thus, the proper determination of the issue of
interim measures of relief is critical to any successful international arbitration.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND INTERIM MEASURES
A. Generally
While the different sets of rules of each arbitral institution
are fairly similar, the problem of interim measures of protection
is not effectively addressed by any of the various institutional
rules. Although arbitration rules may provide for the issuance
of interim measures of relief, there has been no uniform practice among arbitral tribunals in granting or denying such relief.128 Instead, some arbitral tribunals grant interim measures,
others explicitly do not, and some tribunals direct parties to
national courts for resolution of interim awards.129 Tribunals
refer parties to courts because arbitral tribunals possess no coercive power for enforcement of their interim orders, and because provisional remedies can only be properly enforced
through the court system.130 Although interim measures can be
coercively enforced through the courts, presenting arbitral orders to courts is often problematic.
B. The UNCITRAL
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules contain a single provision
that expressly permits arbitral tribunals, as well as courts, to
order interim measures of protection.131 While the UNCITRAL
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Larsen, supra note 5.
See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28.
See Bosch, supra note 75.
UNCITRAL, Article 26(1) states:

At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take interim
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the
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Rules allow for both direct arbitral award of interim relief as
well as court awarded relief, the Rules provide no guidance as
to the enforcement of measures.132 The Rules provide no coercive power to the arbitral tribunal for enforcement of any interim measures of relief.133
C. The ICC
The ICC Rules also do not effectively address the problem.
The ICC Rules were amended in 1998 to add that, “at the request of a party, [the tribunal should] order interim or conservatory measures it deems appropriate.”134 While this provision
permits the arbitral tribunal to grant interim measures, the
ICC Rules possess no enforcement mechanism. Although parties may be reluctant to disregard arbitral tribunal decisions,
the ICC Rules do not provide for sanctions against parties who
remain recalcitrant and do not follow such orders.135
D. The AAA
Section 22 of the AAA International Arbitration Rules (“AAA
Rules”)136 allows arbitral tribunals to grant interim measures.137
Parties to an arbitration agreement are also entitled to request
provisional relief from public courts.138 This entitlement comes
dispute, including measures for the conservation of goods forming the
subject matter in the dispute, such as ordering their deposit with a
third person or the sale of perishable goods.
132. See BINDER, supra note 51
133. Id.
134. DERAINS, supra note 40, at 274.
135. Id.
136. AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra note 21, § 22.
At the request of any party, the tribunal may take whatever interim
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the
dispute, including measures for the conservation of the goods which
are the subject matter in dispute, such as ordering their deposit with
a third person or the sale of perishable goods.
Id.
137. Rule 34 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules states: “[t]he arbitrator may issue such orders for interim relief as may be deemed necessary to
safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration without
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final determination of the dispute.”
138. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 10.
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from Rule 34 and Section 22(3).139 Pursuant to Section 22(3) of
the AAA Rules, court proceedings seeking provisional relief will
never constitute a waiver of the underlying arbitration proceedings.140
E. The LCIA
In LCIA arbitration, the arbitrator can order the preservation, storage, or sale or other disposal of any property or thing
under the control of any of the parties.141 In addition, the parties in LCIA arbitration are free to request pre-award conservatory measures from a competent public court.142 The LCIA
Rules grant arbitrators authority to order a party to provide
“security for legal or other costs,” and “upon such terms as the
Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate,” including the provision of a cross-indemnity.143 Arbitrators may order sanctions
against a party that fails to comply with an order to provide
security, by staying or dismissing that party’s claims or counterclaims in an award.144 Another provision indicates that the
arbitral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to order security for
legal and other costs.145
F. International Arbitration Treaties
In addition to consulting the arbitration agreement, various
institutional arbitration rules, and any applicable national
laws, parties must also take into account any applicable inter139. Id. Section 22(3) provides: “[a] request for interim measures addressed
by a party to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the
agreement to arbitrate or a waiver of the right to arbitrate.”
140. Id.
141. See LCIA Rules, supra note 22, art. 13.1.
142. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 11–12. Article 15.4 of the LCIA Rules
provides that, “[w]ithout prejudice to the right of any party to apply to a competent court for pre-award conservatory measures (except those referred to in
Art 15.), the tribunal shall also have the power to order any party to provide
security for all or part of any amount in dispute in the arbitration.” LCIA
Rules, supra note 22, art. 15.4.
143. See Gregoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial
Arbitration under the ICC, AAA, LCIA, and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 123, 125 (1999).
144. Id. at 129
145. Id. at 130.
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national arbitration conventions or treaties.146 Unlike the institutional arbitration rules previously set forth, the New York
Convention has no provision expressly referring to awards of
provisional measures by arbitrators.147 While the 1961 European Convention148 provides that “[a] request for interim measures or measures of conservation addressed to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the arbitration
agreement, or regarded as a submission of the substance of the
case to the court,”149 the New York Convention is silent as to
interim measures. In fact, some U.S. courts have interpreted
Article II(3)150 of the New York Convention to preclude courts
from granting pre-award attachments based upon the intent of
the New York Convention to prevent significant judicial intervention until after an arbitration award is made.151 However,
there is also the sentiment, based on Article VI(1)(e),152 that the
New York Convention has a permissive attitude toward court
enforcement of provisional remedies in arbitration.153 In the
146. See BORN, supra note 112, at 921.
147. Id. at 922.
148. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 484
U.N.T.S. 364 (1963) [hereinafter EC].
149. See id. art. VI(4).
150. The EC, Article II(3) provides:
The court of a contracting State, when seized on an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that said agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
Id. art. II(3).
151. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir.
1974); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A., 456 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1982). But
see, Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
152. EC Article VI(1)(e) provides:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has
been made to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the
authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if
it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the
award and may also, on application of the party claiming enforcement
of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.
EC, supra note 148, art. VI(1)(e).
153. See Bernado M. Cremades, Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts’ Jurisdiction over Conservatory Measures to be Introduced through a Revision of the
Convention?, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 105 (1989).
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absence of uniform provisions on this issue in the New York
Convention, each country must determine whether, and under
what conditions, such measures can be taken by its own
courts.154
G. Specific Difficulties in Granting Interim Measures in Arbitration
The contractual nature of arbitration gives rise to several
unique difficulties. First, a common difficulty in arbitration
occurs when resolution of the dispute involves a third party.155
Issues often arise when interim measures are needed in the
form of orders that have an effect on those who are not party to
the agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, when a third party witness’ testimony is needed, there are few legal or practical means
for the arbitrators to compel such testimony.156 Secondly, when
interim measures of protection are needed against one of the
parties to the arbitration, issues arise as to the availability of
such remedies when they are sought at early stages in an arbitral proceeding.157
Generally, the arbitral tribunal, if it is empowered by the respective governing rules, only has the power to grant interim
measures of relief to the parties who are subject to the arbitration. In other words, one significant problem of international
arbitration is that a third party, who may possess necessary
information or vital assets, cannot be subject to interim measures because that third party has not agreed to be bound by the
arbitration. For example, in Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of

154. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 712–13. For arguments for
and against revision of the New York Convention, see Cremades, supra note
153 (arguing for further development of international arbitration law and no
revision of the convention), and V.V. Veeder, Provisional and Conservatory
Measures, in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION, EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 22 (1999) (arguing for a supplemental convention, to allow enforcement of interim measures).
155. See Bernardini, The Powers of the Arbitrator, in CONSERVATORY
MEASURES, supra note 101, at 21.
156. See Lawrence W. Newman, International Arbitration Unfinished Business, 225 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Newman I].
157. See Lawrence W. Newman and Michael Burrows, Provisional Remedies
in Aid of Arbitration, 212 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Newman
II].
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Hawaii,158 an arbitration conducted by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the tribunal decided that the basis of the dispute
was the treatment of the plaintiff by the U.S.159 Moreover, the
tribunal noted that the respondent requested interim measures
of protection against the U.S.160 The tribunal explicitly stated
that it lacked jurisdiction to award interim measures against
non-parties.161 Therefore, one of the apparent difficulties of interim measures in the international arbitration context is the
inability to apply these types of measures to third parties.
Parties to arbitration also face difficulties when one party
seeks interim relief at an early stage of the proceeding. In arbitration, it is typically difficult to obtain such relief expeditiously, because the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted.162 As a result, a party in need of provisional relief can
obtain it only in the regular courts. If a party seeks to delay the
opposing party’s request for an injunction or attachment, that
party can slow the process considerably by taking a long time to
select an arbitrator. There are times when parties need immediate recourse, i.e., to enjoin an imminent action, and the arbitration procedure simply does not accommodate this need.
Thus, most parties in need of this immediate assistance seek
the aid of national courts for this emergency relief.163 However,
as the parties go to court, they encounter another different
realm of problems with court issuing interim measures.
When parties seek interim relief in national courts, they are
confronted with several difficult issues. First, some U.S. courts
have ruled that provisional relief is not available from a court
158. Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, PCA Arbitration, available
at http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/#Larsen.
159. See Award, Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, Procedural Order 6.2(10), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/LHKAward.pdf.
160. Id.
161. See id. at Procedural Order 3.
162. See Newman I, supra note 156.
163. See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security for
Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In
Toto), 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155 (1998). The need for emergency relief is particularly pervasive in the context of intellectual property and technology law.
In the world of intellectual property, speed is God, and when dealing with
infringing patent, copyright, or intellectual property rights, emergency relief
is especially needed because the infringement is hard to detect and difficult to
quantify in monetary terms. See id.
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when the parties have provided for arbitration.164 Secondly,
courts that do provide provisional relief in such cases have
ruled that a party that seeks relief in court waives its right to
arbitrate.165 Furthermore, the losing party in a motion before a
court may have a right to appeal, and through appeal may slow
the arbitration process considerably.166 Thus, the difficulty
posed by the need for interim relief in the early stage of the arbitration is not resolved by recourse to courts. Instead, recourse
to courts tends to cause, rather than resolve, problems for the
parties to the arbitration.
H. The Problem in the U.S.
Currently, the different institutional rules, national arbitration laws, and judicial precedents, are varied and in disarray.
The state of international arbitration in the U.S. is a typical
example of the perplexing nature of the law. Federal courts
disagree over the effect of the New York Convention on the authority of national courts to grant provisional relief in aid of
international arbitration. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v.
CEAT, Spa167 is the seminal decision holding that Article II(3) of
the New York Convention forbids court-ordered provisional relief in aid of arbitration. In short, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in McCreary, concluded that McCreary’s judicial action for provisional relief was in fact designed to frustrate
the arbitral process that it had agreed to and, therefore, the
New York Convention precluded the suit and the request for
attachment.168 The plain language of McCreary is that Article
II(3) divests a national court of jurisdiction to order attachment
in aid of arbitration, or to do anything else other than to compel
arbitration. As the McCreary court stated, “the purpose of the
[New York] Convention will be best carried out by restricting
pre-arbitration judicial action to determining whether arbitration should be compelled.”169 Some state courts have also fol-

164.
1974).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir.
Id.
See Garnett, supra note 6, at 15.
McCreary Tire, 501 F.2d 1032.
See BORN, supra note 112, at 937.
McCreary Tire, 501 F.2d 1032.
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lowed the McCreary rationale. In Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A.,170 the New York State Court of Appeals interpreted
the New York Convention, as purportedly requiring courts
“seized of” matters that are the subject to agreements to arbitrate to refer the matter to arbitration without addressing the
substance of those matters. In fact, a number of lower federal
courts have also followed the McCreary rationale.171
On the other hand, a number of cases have rejected the rationale of McCreary and held that Article II(3) permits courtordered attachments in aid of international arbitration. In
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,172 a federal district court
suggested that coercive remedies and other court-ordered intervention available only through courts may often facilitate the
arbitration process rather than denigrate it. Thus, the court
held that resort to courts for interim measures is not necessarily inconsistent with the reference of the merits of the dispute to
arbitration.173 In addition, the court held that “nothing in the
text of the [New York] Convention itself suggests that it precludes pre-judgment attachment.”174 The weight of lower U.S.
court authority has followed Carolina Power and rejected the
premise that Article II(3) flatly forbids all court-ordered provisional measures in aid of arbitration.175 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.

170. Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (1982).
171. A number of lower courts have followed the holding of McCreary in
holding that Article II(3) of the Convention prohibits national courts from ever
ordering attachments in aid of an international arbitration that is subject to
the Convention. See I.A.T.D. Assoc. Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.
1981); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas
Bumi Nasional, 427 F.Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attachment); Drexel Burnham
Labert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 139 A.D.2d 323 (1st Dept. 1988); Shah v. Eastern
Silk Industries, Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div. 1985).
172. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp 1044 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. For other lower court decisions adopting the Carolina Power position,
see Daye Nonferrous Metals Co. v. Trafigura Beheer BV, 1997 WL 375680
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting injunctive relief against transfers of funds, in aid of
arbitration in Paris); Alvenue Shipping v. Delta Petroleum (U.S.A.), Ltd., 876
F. Supp 482, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting preliminary injunctive relief in aid
of arbitration in New York Convention signatory); Filantro Spa v. Chilewich
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U.S. courts have also disagreed over the effect of national legislation on the authority of national courts to grant provisional
relief in aid of international arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explicitly allowed courts to attach property in international arbitrations. In Borden Inc. v.
Meiji Milk Products Co.176, the court held that “entertaining an
application for a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration is
consistent with the court’s power under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.”177 On the other hand, some courts have
held that court-ordered provisional measures are not available
under the FAA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey,178
held that absent an agreement permitting court-ordered provisional measures, the “unmistakably clear congressional purpose” was to bar such measures.179
Finally, in the U.S., state arbitration legislation also has an
impact on interim measures in international arbitration. The
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“N.Y.C.P.L.R.”) is particularly anomalous in the realm of permitting attachments or
injunctions in international arbitration. The New York State
Legislature enacted a provision, now N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section
7502(c),180 which, on its face, permits provisional remedies in aid
of arbitration. Section 7502(c) reads: “[t]he Supreme Court in
the county in which an arbitration is pending . . . may entertain
an application for an order of attachment or for a preliminary
injunction in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but
only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant
may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief.”181 However, the “wrapper” of the bill, which became N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section 7502(c), contained a notation, in the
nature of legislative history, that limited the scope of the provi-

Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (McCreary is “facially absurd”),
appeal dismissed, 985 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
176. Borden Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir 1990).
177. Id. at 826.
178. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286
(8th Cir. 1984).
179. Id. at 1290.
180. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7502(c).
181. Id.
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sion to domestic arbitration.182 The New York Court of Appeals’
interpretation of the provision is consistent with the legislative
history. However, in N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section 6202,183 the rules
permit attachments of the assets of persons not residents or
domiciliaries of New York or not qualified to do business in the
state. The rationale is evidently that individuals and corporations without a presence in New York are those who are likely
to remove their assets from the state.184 The limitation on the
scope of Section 7502(c) makes attachments in aid of arbitration
available only in a special class of cases, those in which domestic defendants are regarded as likely to remove their assets
from New York.185
The problem of national court authority to grant interim
measures in aid of arbitration is clear. In the U.S. alone, courts
disagree over the authority granted by international agreements, national legislation, and state legislation. In addition to
international agreements, national legislation, and state legislation, consideration also must be given to the specific institutional arbitration rules chosen by the parties. All too often, in
the context of interim measures of relief, there is disagreement
over interpretation of any of these several sources of arbitration
law. A solution that would provide a uniform approach to the
granting and enforcement of interim measures of relief in aid of
arbitration would solve a clear conflict in international arbitration law.
V. APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Effective interim relief in arbitration requires cooperation between parties subject to arbitration and the courts. While arbitration is a result of a private contractual agreement and its
settlement is handled outside of court, the court system frequently becomes involved. Courts are often involved with arbitration because arbitrators lack the power to enforce orders. As
the effectiveness of an interim measure of protection depends,
in the end, on its enforceability, court support may be needed.
The critical question is how to best apply interim measures of
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Newman I, supra note 156.
See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 6202.
See Newman I, supra note 156.
Id.
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protection, with their need for enforcement sanctions, to the
realm of arbitration.
Jurisdictions apply several approaches to addressing the issue of interim measures in aid of arbitration. First, some jurisdictions, most notably England, apply the court subsidiarity
approach. In this approach, parties seek to obtain interim
measures through the arbitral tribunal and look only to the
courts as a last resort.186 Second, other jurisdictions allow parties the free choice of applying for interim measures of relief
The
from either arbitral tribunals or national courts.187
UNCITRAL M.L., as well as states such as Germany and Hong
Kong, institutes the free choice model.188 Finally, a small number of states continue to rule that arbitrators are completely
restricted from granting interim measures.189
A. Court Subsidiarity Model
The arbitration law of England presents an original approach
to addressing the issue of interim measures in aid of arbitration. Jan K. Schaefer calls this approach “the court subsidiarity
model.”190 England passed the 1996 Arbitration Act in an effort
to make the law on arbitration simpler and clearer, and to promote arbitration in their country.191 Until the Arbitration Act of
1996 was passed, arbitration law was a mixture of common law
and statute, and it was necessary to refer to the Arbitration
Acts of 1950, 1975, and 1979, as well as a voluminous body of
case law.192 Instead of adopting the UNCITRAL M.L., which

186. See infra text accompanying notes 189–219.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 220–37.
188. See Jan K. Schaefer, New Solutions for Interim Measures of Protection
in International Commercial Arbitration: English, German, and Hong Kong
Law
Compared,
2.2
ELECTRONIC
J.
COMP.
L.
(1998),
at
http://www.ejcl.org/22/art22-2.doc.
189. Italy and Greece represent jurisdictions that do not permit arbitral
tribunals to grant any form of interim relief.
190. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 1.
191. See David Fraser, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes
Under English Law, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (1997).
192. For background on the Arbitration Act of 1996, see Jonathan Hill,
Some Private International Law Aspects of the Arbitration Act 1996, 46 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 274 (1997).
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was significantly different from existing English law, the legislature decided to amend its own law.193
The new English law adopted a relatively original approach
with regard to interim measures of protection in arbitration.
The Arbitration Act of 1996 established a system of court subsidiarity. The underlying philosophy regards the court as the
last resort.194 The ability to grant interim relief is first allocated
to the arbitrator.195 The parties may agree to give the tribunal
the power to order, on a provisional basis, any relief which it
could grant in a final award.196 However, if the parties do not so
agree, then the tribunal has no such power.197 The parties may
also, subject to the mandatory provisions of the Act, regulate
the conduct of their arbitration by reference to institutional
rules.198 The parties have great autonomy under the English
Arbitration Act; they may agree to allow a tribunal the power to
grant interim injunctions, but such power will not be vested in a
tribunal unless the parties so agree.199
Sections 38 and 39 allow parties the ability to grant the arbitrators competence to order interim measures of relief.200 Section 38 confers upon the arbitrator the power to preserve evidence, order security for costs, and other general powers.201 Section 39 confers upon the arbitral tribunal the power to grant
provisional orders.202 Section 39 must be read in conjunction
with Section 48, which contains the remedies an arbitrator can
grant in an award. Section 39(1) makes available, upon party
agreement, the arbitrator’s power to grant, provisionally, any
remedy that the arbitrator could grant in a final award under
Section 48.203 Section 66(1) allows parties to seek the aid of
courts for the enforcement of arbitral orders made under Sec193. See Fraser, supra note 191, at 3–4.
194. See Schaefer, supra note 186, § 4.1.2.1.
195. See David Brynmor Thomas, Interim Relief Pursuant to Institutional
Rules Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, 13 ARB. INT’L 405 (1997).
196. Arbitration Act of 1996 § 39(1), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 155 (1997) [hereinafter Arbitration Act].
197. Id. § 39(4).
198. Id. § 4(3).
199. See Thomas, supra note 195.
200. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, §§ 38, 39.
201. Id. § 38.
202. Id. § 39.
203. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.2.
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tion 38 or 39.204 In the alternative, parties may seek to enforce a
provisional order through the application of Section 42. Under
Section 42, the court may make an order requiring a party to
comply with a peremptory order of the tribunal.205 However,
this may only be sought by the tribunal or by a party with the
tribunal’s permission, unless the parties have agreed that the
court’s powers under Section 42 will be available.206 Before
granting court enforcement of the arbitral award, courts are
required to determine that all possible arbitral forums and
methods to obtain enforcement have been exhausted.207
In the court subsidiary approach, the court can only step in to
grant interim measures under certain preconditions.208 Section
44 of the Arbitration Act governs “court powers exercisable in
support of arbitral proceedings.”209 Section 44(5) is the crucial
provision governing a court’s power to grant interim measures
in aid of arbitration.210 Section 44(5) provides, “[i]n any case the
court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal
and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for
the time being to act effectively.”211 Schaefer has called this section the “effectiveness test.” The test is designed to determine if
the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim for interim relief.212
A party may wish to seek an interim measures from a judge for
reasons of speed or immediate enforceability. However, as well
as persuading the judge that it is entitled to the interim measures, the party will also have to prove, based on Section 44(5),
that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to make the interim measures or that it is unable for the time being to act effectively.213

204. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 407.
205. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 42.
206. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 407.
207. Id.
208. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1
209. Arbitration Act § 44.
210. See ROBERT MERKIN, ARBITRATION ACT 1996, AN ANNOTATED GUIDE
(1996).
211. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 44(5).
212. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1
213. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 408.
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Moreover, in English Arbitration law, ex parte Mareva injunctions214 and Anton Piller orders215 are crucial weapons in the arsenal of a claimant. Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders are granted ex parte and only in cases where the party
seeking the injunction demonstrates urgency. These measures
may only be granted by courts, and not arbitrators, even if the
parties agree to allow arbitrators that power.216 Section 44’s
exceptions do not apply; parties may apply directly to courts,
without tribunal approval, and may seek these measures even if
the arbitral tribunal is not yet constituted.217
The benefits of the court subsidiary model are clear. To limit
court intervention as far as possible serves the needs of arbitration because court applications can seriously delay and hamper
private dispute resolution.218 However, in most cases, court involvement is inevitable, especially during the enforcement
stage. The English Act takes this into account when it provides
for a special enforcement mechanism for arbitrator-granted interim relief.219 However, the “effectiveness test” confers upon
the courts the decision of whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to order interim measures. Schaefer argues that it is
the parties who are in the best position to determine if the arbitral tribunal should have the power to order such measures.220
214. See Adam Johnson, Interim Measures of Protection under the Arbitration Act 1996, 1 INT. A.L.R. 9–18, 14 (1997). An ex parte Mareva injunction is
an order directed to the defendant that prevents him from dealing with his
assets pending judgment or, in the arbitration context, pending award. Such
an injunction is often coupled with an order requiring the defendant to disclose information and documents concerning his assets. Mareva injunctions
are often urgent, and conducted in an ex parte setting, without notice to the
defendant.
215. See id. The Anton Piller order is an order issued by a court to preserve
evidence. First developed in cases in the intellectual property context, in
which potential defendants who were given notice of proceedings would often
seek to prevent the successful prosecution of claims against them by destroying any offending materials in their possession, an Anton Piller order is a type
of search and seizure order that requires the applicant or his representatives
to be given access to the defendants premises to search for and retain in safekeeping documents or other materials relevant to the action which might otherwise be destroyed.
216. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1
217. See Johnson, supra note 214, at 14–15.
218. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 5.1.1.
219. See id. § 4.1.2.1.
220. See id. § 5.1.1.
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Indeed, this new approach, although intended to cut back on
court involvement and make arbitration simpler and clearer,
may not accomplish its goals. The “efficiency test” and “urgency
test”221 could further stimulate dispute over interpretation and
therefore be a source of delay and frustration. The approach is
not without its drawbacks.
B. Free Choice Model
222

In the free choice model of interim relief, a party has the
choice to apply either to the court or to the arbitral tribunal to
obtain the measure of protection sought. There are no restrictions imposed on court access and there is no need for a party to
seek permission from the arbitrator to apply to the court. The
UNCITRAL M.L. is an example of a free choice model because
the M.L. allows access to both arbitral tribunals and courts in
223
The free choice model and the
seeking interim relief.
UNCITRAL M.L. are designed to provide a maximum degree of
224
Unlike the court subsidiary model, which
party autonomy.
reserves the court as last resort and gives courts the ultimate
decision-making power over whether an arbitral tribunal has
the power to issue interim measures, the free choice model
leaves the choice to the parties. The parties are autonomous in
deciding by agreement the various aspects of their arbitration,
including whether to seek interim measures of relief from
courts or the arbitral tribunal.
In 1998, Germany adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. and accordingly changed its arbitration regime to accept the legitimacy of
225
Germany may
interim orders issued by arbitral tribunals.
221. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 44(4). The “urgency test” is used to
determine if an application for interim measures of protection is needed immediately, such as a freezing of bank accounts to prevent asset dispersion, or
if the remedy is non-urgent, where the speed of the order is not as essential.
See Schaefer, supra note 188.
222. Jan Schaefer calls the German arbitration law the “free-choice” approach to interim measures of protection. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 1.
223. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 21, art. 17. See also BINDER, supra
note 51.
224. See Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL
Model Law in Germany, 13 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 38 (1998) [hereinafter
Berger I].
225. See Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, Germany adopts the UNCITRAL Model
Law, 1 INT. A.L.R. 121–26 (1998) [hereinafter Berger II].

File: WANG Base Macro Final.doc

1090

Created on: 6/21/2003 12:42 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:25 PM

[Vol. 28:3

have been motivated to pass this new law because, despite the
country’s economic strength, stability, and modern infrastruc226
ture, the state was an unpopular arbitration venue. Germany
adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. in an attempt to demonstrate
that the German legal system espouses international standards
227
The hope is expressed that a
of arbitral law and practice.
modern and easily acceptable framework will attract arbitra228
tion parties to Germany. As a result of this change, Germany
is now a state that follows the free choice model approach to
interim measures of relief. Under the old German arbitration
law, arbitral tribunals were unable to issue interim measures of
229
Interim orders issued by arbitral tribunals were
protection.
230
However, unpreviously regarded as unenforceable awards.
der the modified M.L. regime, interim measures are available
and not restricted to relief contained in the German Code of
231
Civil Procedure.
In the German free choice model, the arbitrator may grant interim measures of relief only at the request of a party.232 The
arbitrator’s ability to grant interim measures is discretionary.233
The parties may also, under Section 1033, seek interim measures of relief from the courts.234 The court ordered measures of
protection are not discretionary — if certain preconditions are
226. See The New German Law on Arbitration, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 45 (1998). See also Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.1. For example, 90%
of all ICC arbitration between 1980 and 1982 were held in Europe; however,
in only 2.5% of the cases was Germany the chosen forum. See Bosch, supra
note 75.
227. See Berger I, supra note 224, at 45.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Berger I, supra note 224, at. 45. In fact, German arbitral tribunals
may have the power to order Mareva injunction-type remedies which are unknown to the German Code.
232. See Section 1041, German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung), 10th Book, Bundesgesetzblatt I (1997) 3324, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paullson ed., 2002), available at http://www.dis-arb.de/materialien/schiedsverfahrensrecht98.html (German version). For an unofficial translation and
commentary on the German Arbitration Law, see also The New German Law
on Arbitration, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 45 (1998).
233. Id.
234. See German Code § 1033.
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met, the court has to order the measure.235 This difference gives
an advantage to non-discretionary, court ordered relief. The
policy of free choice is taken seriously because parties can
choose to opt for the riskier arbitral tribunal granted interim
measures, or can go through a possibly longer, more expensive
route of seeking court ordered interim protection.236 Despite the
difference, the German model tries to make the two choices
equally as effective through enforcement of the orders by the
courts. Section 1041(2) allows the court to permit enforcement
of interim measures granted by arbitral tribunals.237 In a
unique solution to cross-border arbitration problems, Section
1062(2)238 also gives competence to a court to enforce an arbitrator’s interim order, even if the seat of arbitration is outside of
Germany.239 The German arbitration laws are a very good example of an attempt to create a free-choice model approach to
interim measures of protection.
For a free choice model to be successful, it is necessary for the
state, or the national courts, to grant arbitral tribunals wide
discretion in the types of interim measures that can be granted.
One problem with the free choice model is that most states are
reluctant to grant such broad discretion to an arbitral tribunal
whose decision is typically not subject to review. Secondly, parties can generally opt out of many provisions, and they may opt
out and decide that the arbitral tribunal shall not have the
power to grant interim measures, thus eliminating the free
choice and limiting the parties’ autonomy.

235.
236.
237.
238.

See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.2.1.
Id.
See German Code § 1041(2).
The German Code, Section 1062(2) provides:

If the place of arbitration in the cases referred to in subsection 1,…,is
not in Germany, competence lies with the Higher Regional Court
where the party opposing the application has his place of business or
place of habitual residence, or where assets of that party or the property in dispute or affected by the measure is located, failing which the
Berlin Higher Regional Court shall be competent.
239. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.2.1.
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C. No Interim Relief from Arbitrators At All?
A small number of states, including Argentina240 and Italy,241
maintain that arbitral tribunals do not have the power to grant
interim measures of relief. In these states, interim measures of
protection are unavailable through the arbitral tribunal and
may only be obtained through recourse to national courts. This
approach is flawed because it denies parties the ability to
choose whether arbitrators can grant provisional relief, and it
inevitably forces parties to resort to courts, while the parties’
original intentions were clearly to avoid judicial interference
with their dispute.
D. Other Approaches
1. ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure
The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure provide
the business world with a new procedure through which rapid
action may be taken when certain difficulties arise in the course
of a contractual relationship.242 Within the framework of arbitration, this procedure allows urgent orders to be issued even
before the proceedings are instituted.243 Inspired by the French
Juge des referes,244 the ICC created a set of rules that allow for a
quick provisional decision on urgent matters, that either party
must comply with, subject to its right to apply for a review of
the decision by the arbitral tribunal or state court.245
The appointment of a Pre-Arbitral Referee is provided for before the arbitral proceedings are instituted. Upon application of
240. Argentine National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Codigo
Procesal Civil y commercial de la Nacion), Book VI, tit. I, art. 753, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paullson ed., 2002).
241. Italian Code of Civil Procedure (codice civile), Book Four, tit. VIII, Arbitration, as amended by Law n. 25, Jan. 5, 1994, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I, art. 818 (Jan Paullson ed.,
2002).
242. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 435.
243. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 648.
244. The name of the procedure means “judge hearing urgent applications.”
See French Civil Procedural Code, arts. 482–92. See also FOUCHARD, supra
note 40, at 728–34, for a discussion about the French refere provision procedure.
245. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 648.
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a party to an arbitration agreement, the ICC Court of Arbitration appoints a person to decide on applications for urgent
measures only.246 This procedure takes place before the arbitral
tribunal is even composed because the selection of arbitrators
tends to slow the process down. The decision of the referee is
provisional but binding on the parties. Parties may appeal to
the competent jurisdiction (either the arbitral tribunal or state
court) for review of the order, but the order is binding upon the
parties for a limited period of time.247 It must be stressed that
the Pre-Arbitral Referee procedure may be resorted to only on
the basis of a written agreement between the parties.248 The
agreement to submit to a pre-arbitral referee may be made in
the relevant contract or at some time thereafter.249
Unfortunately, not many parties have taken advantage of the
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; thus, there is no clear indication if this resolution is an effective mechanism for solving the
problem of interim measures in arbitration. However, the procedure appears inadequate for two reasons. First, the PreArbitral Rules do not apply unless the parties have specifically
declared them to be applicable. In most cases, if the agreement
has not been made in advance, it is unlikely that disputing parties will agree to an expedited referee procedure. Second, the
procedure for appointing a referee may take up to seven days.
With regard to certain disputes, especially those related to intellectual property, seven days may not be sufficiently expeditious.250

246. Id.
247. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 435.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Francis Gurry, The Need for Speed, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
events/conferences/1997/october/gurry.html (discussing, in the context of intellectual property, the need for arbitrators to be available on a twenty-four hour
basis to decide urgent interim measures).
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2. The WIPO251 Emergency Relief Rules
The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
drafted a set of Emergency Relief Rules to be used in conjunction with their own WIPO Arbitration Rules. In the intellectual
property context,252 speed is especially important in the resolution of disputes.253 Similar to the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure,254 the WIPO Emergency Rules were designed to confront
the difficulty that exists, before the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal, which is precisely the time at which a party wishes to
seek interim relief.255 The WIPO approach to the lack of availability of interim relief, prior to the constitution of an arbitral
tribunal, is different from the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee approach in several key respects.256 Most notably, the procedure is
integrated at the parties’ option, with the conventional arbitration procedure under the WIPO Arbitration Rules, and uses the
idea of constituting a standby panel of arbitrators to ensure
that an emergency arbitrator can be appointed on twenty-four
hours notice.257 The Emergency Relief Rules do not apply automatically in every case in which parties designate WIPO Arbitration Rules, but instead serves as an optional additional feature to the WIPO Arbitration Rules.258 Where the Emergency
Relief Rules provision is included in the arbitration agreement
and one of the parties initiates an application for emergency
251. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the use and protection of intellectual property. Through its work, WIPO plays an important role in enhancing
the quality and enjoyment of life, as well as creating real wealth for nations.
With headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO is one of the 16 specialized
agencies of the United Nations system of organizations. It administers 21
international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property
protection. The Organization counts 177 nations as member states. See
WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo.en/ (last visited June 7, 2003).
252. Examples of intellectual property arbitrations could include disputes
over injunctive relief sought to prevent disclosure of trade secrets, or to prevent the marketing of a product that infringes upon a patent or a trademark.
253. See Gurry, supra note 250.
254. See discussion supra, Part IV.D.1.
255. See David D. Caron, Proposed WIPO Supplementary Emergency Interim Relief Rules, at http://www.law.berkely.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Courses/
rpid/rp04069.html.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Gurry, supra note 250.
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relief, the emergency arbitrator would be appointed from this
standby committee of arbitrators.259 The standby arbitrator
committee eliminates the possibility of undue delay by a party
through the challenge of arbitrator selection.260 Instead, the
choice of arbitrator in an Emergency Relief application is not up
to the parties, but up to the WIPO Arbitration Center to select
an arbitrator from a published list of arbitrators.261 The parties
still have the right to challenge the appointment of the arbitrator, but this is limited to a period of twenty-four hours after receiving notice of the appointment.262
Furthermore, two forms of application may be brought under
the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules, an ex parte and inter
partes.263 The ex parte procedure,264 one in which the allegedly
aggrieved party would seek relief without serving notice or providing for the participation of the other party, is considered essential for those cases in which there is evidence of bad faith on
the part of the other party, or an indication that notice would
entail the risk that vital evidence might be destroyed or other
irreparable damage done.265 However, an ex parte procedure
and any order made in it by the emergency arbitrator would not
be enforceable under the New York Convention.266 The order
would have contractual status only.267 However, providing
backbone to the procedure, most attorneys would advise their
clients to follow the order, even if it is merely backed by contractual status, especially if the order is backed by sanctions of
liquidated damages in the event of its breach.268 The inter
partes procedure is more common, where parties exchange notice regarding application of the emergency relief rules and both
parties are present for the procedure, which is conducted within
strict and very short time limits.269
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
See Horning, supra note 163.
Id.
Id.
See Gurry, supra note 250.
See WIPO Emergency Relief Rules, art. XIII, in COMPARISON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18.
265. See Gurry, supra note 250.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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The WIPO Emergency Relief Rules represent a new frontier
in international arbitration.270 Since the rules are relatively
new, there is no indication of whether this evolution of arbitration practice and procedure is well adapted to affording parties
reasonable protection of their rights through the arbitration
process in emergencies. Nevertheless, the Emergency Relief
rules are the most expansive and groundbreaking rules addressing interim measures in arbitration practice.
3. The UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration
At its thirty-second session, in 1999, the UNCITRAL had before it a note entitled Possible Future Work in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration.271 The Commission entrusted
the work to one of its working groups, which it named the
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) (“Group”) and
decided that enforceability of interim measures of protection
would be one of the priority items the group would consider.272
From the thirty-third to thirty-sixth sessions, the Group continued to work on the issue of the power of a court or arbitral
tribunal to order interim measures of protection.273 In fact, at
the thirty-sixth session, the Group considered a draft text for a
revision of Article 17274 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.275
The proposed revision of Article 17 contains very important
features that define and clarify the arbitral tribunal’s power to
order interim measures of protection. M.L. Article 17 is general
and does not provide parties or arbitral tribunals with any specific guidance.276 Section (2) of the draft revision of Article 17
270. See Horning, supra note 163, at 175.
271. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [hereinafter
UNCITRAL], Report of the Working Group on Arbitration, 37th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/523 (2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Working Group Report].
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. UNCITRAL, Arbitration: Interim Measures of Protection, Proposal by
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.121 (2002).
275. UNCITRAL Working Group Report, supra note 271.
276. See UNCITRAL M.L. art. 17. Article 17 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may,
at the request of a party, order any party to take such interim measures of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in
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defines specific powers possessed by the arbitral tribunal.277
Section (3) sets forth a standard for tribunals to apply when
making an interim measures determination.278 Section (4) sets
forth a controversial provision under which tribunals are given
the power to make interim orders ex parte.279 For a party to proceed ex parte, that party must demonstrate not only the requirements of Section (3), but also demonstrate that proceeding
without notice is necessary. Orders granted under the ex parte
rules would be provisional, expiring in twenty days, and the
requesting party would be liable for any costs suffered by the
party against whom the measure is ordered (in light of final
disposition on the merits).280 The draft revision of Article 17
also mandates that the requesting party provide security as a
precondition to granting the measure and also provide the tribunal with any material change in circumstances on the basis
on which the party sought the interim measure.281 Finally, the
draft revision provides that the tribunal may modify or terminate an interim measure at any time.282
The Group has also considered the issues of interim measures
granted by courts and the recognition and enforcement of interim measures.283 The Group has done valuable and considerable work in the field of arbitration and the revision of M.L. Article 17 is a great step in resolving the problem of interim measures in international arbitration.
respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal
may require any party to provide appropriate security in connection
with such measure.
277. UNCITRAL Working Group Report, supra note 271. Section (2) allows
tribunals to make orders preserving the status quo, issuing injunctions, providing security for costs, and preserving evidence relevant to the resolution of
the dispute. Id. § (2).
278. Id. Section (3) provides that the tribunal may order interim measures
when the requesting party has demonstrated that: (a) there is an urgent need
for the measure; (b) irreparable harm will result if the measure is not ordered,
and that harm substantially outweighs the harm that will result to the party
opposing the measure if the measure is granted; and (c) there is a substantial
possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the dispute.
Id. § (3).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Amendment of the New York Convention
Although interim measures of protection have been generally
enforced by most courts, it is necessary for the New York Convention to be amended to include a specific provision mandating
courts of nations bound by the treaty to also recognize and enforce interim measures of relief. Such an amendment would
resolve conflicts in nations like the U.S., where some courts
have enforced arbitrator-granted interim measures284 and some
courts have expressly denied such enforcement.285 Because enforcement is one of the most important aspects of a successful
arbitration, it is necessary to ensure proper enforcement of the
critical interim measures or provisional remedies granted by
arbitral tribunals.
B. Add Mandatory Rules Governing the Granting and Enforcement of Interim Measures of Relief to All Institutional Arbitration Rules
Because difficulties in interim measures are most often encountered at the critical, early stages of the proceedings, before
the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, it is necessary for all
arbitration institutions to adopt procedures similar to the ICC
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure or the WIPO Emergency Relief
Rules, which ameliorate this problem and help ensure the efficacy of arbitration. Due to the contractual nature of arbitration
agreements, it may be difficult to enforce these as mandatory
provisions. However, it is necessary for institutions to highly
recommend these procedures and possibly give some benefit to
this provision being added to the agreement. In addition, it is
necessary for practitioners to urge their clients to include these
vital provisions, which can protect the party’s most valuable
assets or claims in the arbitration.

284. See Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
285. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co v. CEAT Spa, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir.
1974).
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C. Adopt the Proposed Revisions of UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17
The proposed revisions of UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 17
provide an interesting answer to the dilemma posed by interim
measures in international arbitration. The proposed revision
provides an effective system of arbitrator-ordered, courtenforced, and court-ordered interim remedies that will aid the
practice of international arbitration. The revision includes limitations on the power of tribunals and courts to order and enforce interim measures, including certain provisions that limit
the length of time interim measures are effective, provide for
appeal of interim orders, and limit the ability of a party to obtain interim measures ex parte. The UNCITRAL should adopt
this revision to the M.L., as it will provide a solution to a perpetual problem to the M.L. and to international arbitration
generally.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although interim measures of protection in arbitration have
come a long way in recent times and the use of interim measures has proliferated, it is necessary to continue to refine and
alter the system to meet the needs of today’s ever-changing
world of business. To make arbitrations effective, it is necessary to implement some mechanism that can ensure that interim measures can be appropriately granted and enforced.
With the aid of national court systems, institutional rules, and
practicing international lawyers, the state of interim measures
in arbitration has improved greatly. Yet there is still room for
improvement.
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